This and that revisited: A social and multimodal approach to spatial demonstratives by Peeters, D.G.T. & Özyürek, A.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/180066
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2018-07-08 and may be subject to
change.
OPINION
published: 16 February 2016
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00222
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 February 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 222
Edited by:
Hanne De Jaegher,
University of the Basque Country,
Spain
Reviewed by:
Kensy Cooperrider,
University of Chicago, USA
*Correspondence:
David Peeters
david.peeters@mpi.nl
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Cognitive Science,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 22 December 2015
Accepted: 03 February 2016
Published: 16 February 2016
Citation:
Peeters D and Özyürek A (2016) This
and That Revisited: A Social and
Multimodal Approach to Spatial
Demonstratives.
Front. Psychol. 7:222.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00222
This and That Revisited: A Social and
Multimodal Approach to Spatial
Demonstratives
David Peeters 1* and Aslı Özyürek 1, 2
1Neurobiology of Language Department, Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, Nijmegen, Netherlands, 2Centre for
Language Studies, Radboud University, Nijmegen, Netherlands
Keywords: referential communication, language, space, demonstratives, gesture, pointing
As humans, we have the capacity to refer to the things in the world around us. In everyday
spoken communication, we often use words to describe intended referents (such as objects, people,
and events), and our bodies (e.g., eyes, head, and hands) to indicate the location to which our
addressee should focus her attention in order to further identify what we are talking about (Bühler,
1934; Clark and Bangerter, 2004). Traditionally, referring has been described as an autonomous
and addressee-blind act that speakers do on their own without taking into account beliefs about
their addressees’ knowledge about a referent (e.g., Olson, 1970; see Clark and Bangerter, 2004).
In contrast, more recent views consider it rather a collaborative enterprise that requires that
speaker and addressee work together, for instance in reaching mutual agreement on how to
conceptualize and name a particular entity (e.g., Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Brennan and
Clark, 1996; Clark and Bangerter, 2004). Such agreement is established through interaction, and
the addressee is at least as important as the speaker in reaching agreement and establishing
reference.
In prototypical instances of successful referring, speakers often produce spatial demonstratives
like this and that to establish joint attention between speaker and addressee to a visible entity
(Bühler, 1934; Levinson, 1983). Such demonstratives are among the most frequently used words in
language, among the first words infants produce (Clark and Sengul, 1978), and possibly primordial
in phylogeny (Diessel, 2006; Tomasello, 2008). Surprisingly, despite the advances made toward a
social, collaborative account of referring more generally, the prevailing theoretical view on spatial
demonstratives has remained deeply individual and egocentric, as illustrated by the following
claims:
1. “[T]he anchoring point of deictic expressions is egocentric (or, better, speaker-centric). Adult
speakers skillfully relate what they are talking about to this me-here-now” (Levelt, 1989,
p. 46).
2. Spatial demonstratives “indicate the relative distance of an object, location, or person vis-à-vis
the deictic center (. . . ), which is usually associated with the location of the speaker” (Diessel,
1999, p. 36).
3. “[D]emonstratives are interpreted based on the speaker’s body” ((Diessel, 2014), p. 122).
This egocentric account is intuitively appealing and still influential (e.g., Diessel, 2014; Stevens
and Zhang, 2014). In the current paper, we question this account from both the production
and the comprehension side, and discuss recent accumulating observational, experimental, and
neuroscientific evidence that suggests an alternative social and multimodal view of demonstrative
reference.
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PRODUCTION OF DEMONSTRATIVES:
BEYOND EGOCENTRICITY AND RELATIVE
DISTANCE
Although it is generally acknowledged that demonstratives have
a social function in establishing joint attention to a referent
(e.g., Diessel, 2006), the egocentric account claims that when
using a demonstrative “the speaker, by virtue of being the
speaker, casts himself in the role of ego and relates everything
to his viewpoint” (Lyons, 1977, p. 638). Diessel (2014, p. 128)
even states that “speakers of all languages employ an egocentric
coordinate system that is anchored by the speaker’s body at the
time of the utterance,” and argues that the speaker’s body is a
conventionalized aspect of the demonstrative’s meaning (Diessel,
2014, p. 122).
But are speakers really egocentric when using a spatial
demonstrative? Analyses of everyday multimodal and face-to-
face spoken corpora suggest the opposite. Küntay and Özyürek
(2006), for instance, show that speakers of Turkish use the
demonstrative s¸u specifically for referents that are not yet in
the addressee’s visual focus of attention and the demonstrative o
for referents that are in the addressee’s visual focus of attention
(see also Özyürek, 1998). Thus, speakers would not use an
egocentric coordinate system, but rather take the viewpoint of
their addressee into account. Jungbluth (2003), furthermore,
reports that the physical orientation of both interlocutors relative
to each other in a conversation drives demonstrative choice
in Spanish. When speaker and addressee are face-to-face in a
conversational dyad, all referents within the dyad are treated as
proximal “without any further differentiation” (Jungbluth, 2003,
p. 19). Hence, when using a demonstrative, speakers may not be
that egocentric after all.
Critically, the egocentric account generally claims that
spatial demonstratives mainly express a distance contrast (e.g.,
Lyons, 1977; Anderson and Keenan, 1985; Diessel, 1999, 2006,
2014; Coventry et al., 2008). In the case of simple two-term
demonstrative systems, this means that a proximal demonstrative
(English this) indicates a referent relatively nearby the speaker
and a distal demonstrative (English that) indicates a referent
relatively remote from the speaker’s location. For three-term
systems it has been argued that the ‘medial’ demonstrative is
used for entities close to the addressee or for entities at middle
distance from the speaker. Diessel (2014, p. 123) claims that
such “distance specifications of demonstratives are universals.”
However, descriptions of demonstrative systems in terms of
relative distance (either to speaker or addressee) are often based
on linguistic intuitions and not on extensive analyses of everyday
communication or rigorous experimental testing. Observational
and experimental studies suggest that relative distance to the
speaker is often not primarily driving a speaker’s demonstrative
choice.
Enfield (2003, p. 104), for instance, in describing the
Lao two-term demonstrative system, concludes that “distance
cannot be what distinguishes the meanings of these two
demonstratives.” Rather, demonstrative reference is described
as a social, interactive process in which the choice for a
proximal or distal demonstrative depends on how interlocutors
perceive and interpret the physical space during their interaction
(Enfield, 2003). What is perceived as “proximal” may depend,
for instance, on the engagement areas of speaker and addressee
during their conversation (Enfield, 2003; see also Hanks, 1990).
Piwek et al. (2008), moreover, argue that demonstrative choice
in Dutch is not driven by the relative distance of a referent
to the speaker, but by the cognitive and visual accessibility
of a referent to speaker and addressee (see also Burenhult,
2003; Jarbou, 2010). Experimental studies supposedly showing
effects of relative distance (Coventry et al., 2008, 2014) also
show that what is considered as nearby or faraway is very
flexible, for instance depending on whether participants point
with their finger or with a stick, and on a referent’s (context-
dependent) visibility, familiarity, and ownership properties. This
flexibility suggests that, rather than actual physical proximity,
perceived (psychological) proximity is a more important factor
in demonstrative choice (see below).
COMPREHENSION OF DEMONSTRATIVES:
BEYOND EGOCENTRICITY AND RELATIVE
DISTANCE
Due to its focus on the speaker, the egocentric view of
demonstrative reference generally does not consider how
addressees comprehend the demonstratives they hear. However,
according to Diessel (2014), demonstratives are interpreted (by
an addressee) based on the relative distance of an entity to the
speaker’s body. In this view, an addressee will expect that a
speaker uses a proximal demonstrative in reference to an entity
that is relatively close to the speaker’s body at the time of the
utterance and a distal term for entities relatively farther away
from the speaker. This claim is again purely based on linguistic
intuitions and not on empirical testing.
Studies actually investigating demonstrative comprehension
are scarce. Stevens and Zhang (2013, 2014) presented participants
with visual scenes that included a speaker, a hearer, and
a referent, while they listened to an auditory stimulus that
contained a demonstrative (e.g., this/that cat) and while their
electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded. The referent was
either near the speaker, near the hearer, or away from both,
and participants were asked to judge whether the demonstrative
matched the visual scene. Participants’ linguistic judgments were
in line with the egocentric view of demonstrative reference.
However, analysis of their EEGs suggested that they took into
account whether speaker and hearer both gazed at the referent or
not (Stevens and Zhang, 2013) and whether the speaker produced
a pointing gesture to the referent or not (Stevens and Zhang,
2014). Thus, a measure tapping into linguistic intuitions (the
judgment task) was found to be in line with the egocentric view
whereas a measure reflecting online processing (EEG) found
an influence of social factors such as the presence of shared
gaze.
Recently, Peeters et al. (2015b) investigated demonstrative
comprehension in a paradigm in which participants listened to
sentences that contained a demonstrative while they saw a picture
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Participants in Peeters et al. (2015b) were presented with picture stimuli in which a person pointed at one of two objects while they listened to an
auditorily presented sentence that contained either a proximal or a distal demonstrative (e.g., “I have bought this/that apple at the market”). (B) Analysis of
participants’ event-related potentials (ERPs) as derived from their electroencephalograms (EEGs), time-locked to the onset of the demonstrative, suggested a higher
processing cost for distal compared to proximal demonstratives when both objects were in the shared space between speaker and participant (as in the picture),
irrespective of the distance of the referent-object to the speaker. (C) This effect had a fronto-central distribution over the scalp. The topographic plot shows the locus
of the effect over the scalp averaged between 100 and 500ms after the onset of the spoken demonstrative. (D) This finding suggests that speaker and addressee
may create a shared space in which all referents become psychologically proximal.
of a speaker manually pointing at one of two visible objects.
Higher processing costs were found for comprehending distal
compared to proximal demonstratives when referents were in
the shared space between speaker and participant (see Figure 1).
Addressees thus took into account whether a referent was inside
or outside the space that was shared with the speaker. No effect
of the relative distance of the referent to the speaker was found.
These findings suggest that demonstrative comprehension is
sociocentric and involves the we-here-now (Peeters et al., 2015b),
rather than egocentric and driven by the me-here-now (Levelt,
1989).
In sum, paradigms going beyond simple intuitions show
that demonstrative reference, from both a production and a
comprehension perspective, is a joint action rather than an
egocentric, addressee-blind phenomenon.
A SOCIAL AND MULTIMODAL APPROACH
TO DEMONSTRATIVE REFERENCE
The findings discussed above seriously question the egocentric
view that demonstratives express a distance contrast as
calculated from the speaker’s location. We propose a social
alternative: Demonstrative production and comprehension are
not primarily governed by the physical proximity of a referent
to the speaker, but rather by the psychological proximity of a
referent to both speaker and addressee. Moving beyond other
social accounts (e.g., Enfield, 2003; Jarbou, 2010), we suggest
that speaker and addressee jointly establish which referents
are psychologically proximal. Arguably, during interaction
interlocutors keep track of the psychological proximity of
possible referents. Many contextual factors may contribute to a
referent’s degree of psychological proximity. For instance, in face-
to-face conversations, entities inside the shared space between
interlocutors may be experienced as psychologically more
proximal than entities outside the shared space (Jungbluth, 2003;
Peeters et al., 2015b). An increase in visibility, familiarity, and
ownership of possible referents may increase their psychological
proximity (cf. Jarbou, 2010; Coventry et al., 2014). Physical and
social boundaries between speaker, addressee, and referent may
decrease a referent’s psychological proximity (Enfield, 2003).
Experimental manipulations, informed by careful analysis of
everyday demonstrative use, are needed to disentangle the
respective contributions of these different contextual influences
to the perceived psychological proximity of a referent and
the subsequent choice to use one demonstrative and not
another.
Furthermore, speakers often organize their use of a
demonstrative in relation to their manual pointing behavior
(Bangerter, 2004; Cooperrider, in press). Considering
demonstrative reference a social undertaking goes hand in
hand with its multimodal characteristics. Research on pointing
gestures suggests that pointing is often a highly social and
communicative act. It has been found that speakers tailor the
kinematics of their pointing gesture to the communicative
needs of their addressee, for instance by slowing down the
stroke and prolonging the hold phase of their gesture for its
recognition (Peeters et al., 2015a). Moreover, already in very
early stages of life, pointing gestures are often produced with
a declarative motive, i.e., to simply share interest in a certain
referent and for the addressee to recognize one’s communicative
intentions (Tomasello et al., 2007). It is hard to unite such a
view of pointing as deeply social and communicative with an
egocentric view of demonstrative reference in which the speaker
is egocentric when choosing a demonstrative. Rather, the social
and communicative nature of human pointing confirms that
multimodal demonstrative reference is an interpersonal,
collaborative process in which the addressee plays a
pivotal role.
CONCLUSION
Both observational and experimental findings on the production
and comprehension of spatial demonstratives suggest that it is
now time to move away from an egocentric perspective on spatial
demonstrative reference. Demonstratives are better understood
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in an empirically supported social and multimodal account
that considers demonstrative reference a joint action. Such an
account fits well within the broader context of referring as a
social, interactive phenomenon (Clark and Bangerter, 2004),
and is in line with studies looking at joint actions beyond
language (e.g., Vesper and Richardson, 2014). A social and
multimodal approach to demonstrative reference may also offer
new ways to understand how pragmatic language use is acquired
in development (Küntay and Özyürek, 2006) and impaired
in populations that have difficulties in social interaction and
communication.
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